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Political-intelligence elites, Strategic Political Communication 
and the press: the need for, and utility of, a benchmark of public 
accountability demands
Vian Bakir
School of creative Studies and Media, Bangor university, Bangor, gwynedd, Wales, uK
ABSTRACT
This article explores whether the contemporary press adequately holds 
political-intelligence elites accountable when facing Strategic Political 
Communication (SPC) during those long periods when whistle-blowers are 
absent (‘journalism-as-usual’). It develops an original benchmark of public 
accountability demands of political-intelligence elites that the press should 
be capable of making, thereby providing concrete discursive strategies 
to facilitate this difficult task. Demonstrating its utility, this benchmark is 
used to evaluate press oversight during journalism-as-usual and facing 
Obama administration political-intelligence elite SPC on the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program. This shows 
that manipulation of the contemporary press occurs through subtle, but 
effective, SPC techniques involving a certain style of information provision 
that influences national, international, mainstream and alternative press 
outlets’ accountability demands.
Introduction
Spectacular whistle-blowing acts periodically propel state intelligence agencies into global headline 
news, exposing secret practices that contravene human rights, and generating calls for change. For 
instance, Snowden’s leaks in 2013 exposed mass surveillance policies contravening the right to privacy; 
and leaked Abu Ghraib prison torture photos in 2004 exposed detention and interrogation policies 
contravening the right to freedom from torture. However, such whistle-blowing acts, and ensuing 
legislative activity, are rare. This is reflected in Johnson’s ‘shock’ theory of intelligence accountability 
where major intelligence shocks (scandals, failures) instigate legislative programs of reform, but there-
after oversight returns to relative inattentiveness.1 As governments maintain that intelligence agencies 
require complete secrecy to protect ongoing methods, operations and sources, does the contempo-
rary press adequately hold political-intelligence elites accountable during journalism-as-usual (those 
long periods when whistle-blowers are absent), particularly when faced with political-intelligence elite 
manipulative communication designed to limit calls for political accountability?
Drawing on intelligence and journalism scholarship (two disciplines that rarely cross-fertilize), I 
establish that the press-intelligence oversight function is under-theorized. Addressing this, I develop 
a typology (a benchmark) of public accountability demands, namely, demands for political-intelligence 
elite accountability that the press should be capable of. I use this typology to assess accountabil-
ity demands publicly expressed by the US political-intelligence elite and the press in a case study 
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representing a best-case scenario for press oversight. The case study is the Obama administration’s 
attempted public closure in 2014 of the torture-intelligence issue: as demonstrated later, elite dis-
sensus and provision of official evidence together provided ample material enabling press oversight. 
In assessing public accountability demands, I identify contemporary US political-intelligence elite 
manipulative communication practices and their influence in two testing press environments: an elite 
US news outlet with a reputation for objectivity and holding political-intelligence elites accountable 
(The Washington Post), and an unruly, globalized, digital environment (news popular on social media 
network Twitter). Finally, I reflect on the practical utility of the benchmark of public accountability 
demands.
The press and intelligence agency oversight
Journalism scholarship extensively researches the press’ oversight function, articulating principles of 
public journalism2 and the necessity of a free, independent press to ensure political accountability.3 
Influential contemporary explanations into why press oversight is compromised include Bennett’s 
indexing hypothesis, where the press merely indexes itself to the range of publicly articulated political 
dissensus, adopting critical positions only if political elites publicly do so.4 Other explanations focus 
on political manipulation of the press. For instance, Manheim’s research on information and influ-
ence campaigns and Strategic Political Communication (SPC) delineates how political actors use an 
understanding of media environments, human motivation and behaviour to design communication 
to influence public opinion and create enabling environments for governments’ domestic and foreign 
policies.5 Standing against such theories of press control, McNair’s chaos paradigm posits that elites 
are less able to influence news agendas given developments such as the rise of globalized, digital, 
multi-channel media environments allowing new voices to be heard in global civil society.6 While more 
empirical work is needed on agenda-building impacts, especially in globalized, digital environments, 
research suggests that political administrations still broadly set media agendas.7 Whether this arises 
from political manipulation or other factors is unclear. Undoubtedly, however, journalists operating in 
digital environments are increasingly time-constrained, experiencing pressures for immediate publi-
cation and constant updates.8 Furthermore, journalism is resource-poor as declining paying audiences 
generate job redundancies, pressurizing remaining journalists to produce copy for multiple news forms.9 
These factors compromise in-depth, time-consuming, investigative or critical journalism, increasing the 
press’ susceptibility to editorial subsidies, where Public Relations (PR) practitioners go beyond providing 
information (facts, statistics or quotes) to providing news stories’ editorial framing.10
Despite journalism’s long-standing literature on press oversight and manipulation, political- 
intelligence elites’ role in this process is relatively unexamined. This lacuna is problematic as, out of all 
issues, it is on intelligence that the press’ oversight function is likely to be most compromised. This is 
because intelligence has two central characteristics. Firstly, it is uncertain, based on intelligence ana-
lysts’ risk assessments derived from fragmentary, incomplete, often contradictory material of varying 
credibility.11 Secondly, publication of such information is restricted, barring occasional whistle-blowing 
and sanitized official leaking. These characteristics mean that intelligence, if publicized, is highly manip-
ulable by SPC practitioners, while journalists’ ability to assess claims are compromised by absence of 
independent evidence.12
Compared to journalism scholarship, intelligence scholarship is more forthcoming on the press’ 
ability to publicly hold political-intelligence elites accountable,13 indicating practices positioning the 
press as a potentially strong force. These practices include exposing unknown policies14; maintaining 
editorial independence15; and highlighting intelligence failures and demanding reform.16 However, 
intelligence scholarship mostly shows the contemporary press as targeted for manipulation via strat-
egies of secrecy,17 censorship18 and propaganda, the latter including practices such as psychological 
operations,19 selective authorized leaks20 and cultivating sympathetic journalists.21 Yet, while numer-
ous manipulative techniques are apparent, and many are propagandistic, I shall demonstrate that 
manipulation of contemporary press during journalism-as-usual occurs through subtle, but effective, 
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SPC techniques involving a certain style of information provision designed to exploit contemporary press 
environments.
While there are numerous examples of press manipulation and resistance, the area of press-
intelligence oversight is under-theorized. Journalism scholarship neglects oversight issues concerning 
intelligence agencies; and intelligence scholarship largely attends to internal mechanisms of intelligence 
oversight (via legislatures and judiciaries) rather than public oversight (via the press).22 Exceptions 
include Johnson who suggests that US legislative oversight is energized by intelligence failures 
accompanied by high media attention.23 More broadly, Hillebrand theorizes four press roles when 
covering intelligence, namely: information transmitters/stimulators for formal scrutinizers; substitute 
watchdogs, where official oversight fails; legitimizers, reassuring the public about intelligence agencies; 
and uncritical government lapdogs.24 Such theorization, however, does not address SPC practices 
thereby ignoring important aspects of press manipulation. Neither does it detail what press oversight 
of political-intelligence elites could constitute. Bean takes up this question, identifying how journalists 
can ask questions to achieve accountability (through what he terms ‘public dialogue strategies’) when 
dealing with politicians who may be manipulating intelligence for policy goals (as in over-blown claims 
about Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD] that led to the 2003 Iraq invasion).25 
Bean’s analysis, however, is limited to assessing politicians’ public claims about intelligence accuracy 
and value and, as I argue later, ignores vital elements of political-intelligence elite accountability.
Research gaps
There are three research gaps. Firstly, the press’ ability to publically oversee intelligence agencies is 
minimally theorized, paying scant attention to core characteristics of intelligence information (uncer-
tain knowledge, secrecy, political manipulability). This obscures understanding of what effective press 
oversight of political-intelligence elites could constitute. Absence of a benchmark for evaluating press- 
intelligence relationships means that superficial press critique (for instance, extensively reporting on 
problems pre-directed by political-intelligence elites) could (erroneously) be viewed as effective public 
oversight. Secondly, also absent are studies of contemporary SPC practices involving intelligence, and 
their press impacts, especially during journalism-as-usual. Thirdly, reflecting the minimal understanding 
of agenda-building dynamics in globalized, digital contexts, we do not know how far US-originated 
political-intelligence elite SPC reaches across national, international, mainstream and alternative press 
outlets.
I address these gaps by generating a typology of demands for holding political intelligence-elites 
accountable (what I term accountability demands). Each accountability demand comprises component 
‘public dialogue strategies’; Bean’s term for concrete discursive strategies that journalists can use to hold 
politicians accountable.26 My typology identifies specific ways by which the press can hold political-
intelligence elites accountable, thereby providing a practical benchmark both for scholars evaluating 
press oversight, and for journalism practitioners attempting to effect public accountability of political-
intelligence elites. I apply the benchmark to a contemporary case study: declassification of the US 
Senate Intelligence Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation 
Program, hereafter referred to as the Senate Intelligence Committee (SIC) Report.27 This allows in-depth 
examination of varying SPC techniques and reaction from diverse press genres from the USA and 
internationally. This addresses the central question: does the contemporary press adequately hold 
political-intelligence elites to account during periods of journalism-as-usual when facing political-
intelligence elite SPC?
Methods
Case study: the SIC Report
The post-9/11 detention and interrogation policy (2001–8) of George W. Bush’s administration com-
prised Enhanced Interrogation techniques (EITs), extraordinary rendition and secret detention of Al 
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Qaeda terrorist suspects. Fifty-four nation-states’ governments were complicit, hosting secret detention 
sites, refueling rendition planes and sending detainees for torture.28 The secret policy was exposed after 
American press published leaked Abu Ghraib prison torture photos in 2004. The policy was terminated 
as President Obama took office in 2009, and a US Senate Intelligence inquiry was initiated to assess 
the policy, culminating in the SIC Report: its Executive Summary was declassified in December 2014. 
This paper examines US political-intelligence elite SPC, and the press’ resulting ability to publicly hold 
political-intelligence elites accountable, across 2014.
This case study is useful for three reasons. Firstly, given the detention and interrogation program’s con-
travention of international human rights and multiple countries’ complicity, the US political- intelligence 
elite treats official revelations on this issue carefully, elevating them to SPC (as demonstrated later). 
Secondly, by furnishing two elements, the declassification overcomes standard silences characterizing 
intelligence. The first element furnished is evidence: the SIC Report provided the first official public 
evidence of EITs’ ineffectiveness. The second element furnished is elite dissensus: from the investiga-
tion’s inception (2009), intelligence community members including the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) fiercely disputed its critical conclusions. According to Bennett’s indexing hypothesis, during elite 
dissensus the press will voice the widest range of critical voices.29 Together, these elements make this 
moment a best-case scenario for press oversight of political-intelligence elites during  journalism-as-usual. 
Thirdly, release of the SIC Report’s Executive Summary generated intense press and social media cover-
age, presenting an opportunity to explore SPC’s reach not just in American mainstream press, but also 
in what McNair’s chaos paradigm30 regards as a less controllable, globalized, digital environment – news 
popular on social media.
Theoretical sampling
This is a qualitative, theory-building study. Adhering to theoretical sampling tenets,31 I selected samples 
to maximize the likelihood of the phenomenon of interest appearing – namely SPC and accountability 
demands concerning the SIC Report – and to explore SPC’s influence in two testing press environments 
(The Washington Post and news popular on Twitter).
Sampling to detect SPC
As detailed later, there were two US political-intelligence elite SPC phases: on declassification day 
there was an information glut, but prior to this, SPC comprised an occasionally punctured silence. The 
SPC information glut phase was identified by examining the pattern of release of official documents 
since the SIC investigation started in 2009. All publicly released official documents were scrutinized 
(an exhaustive sample) comprising four documents declassified on 9 December 2014: the SIC Report’s 
Executive Summary32: Additional Senate Intelligence Committee Views33; Senate Intelligence Committee 
Minority Views34; and the CIA response.35
The SPC phase of an occasionally punctured silence was ascertained by longitudinal, qualitative anal-
ysis of The Washington Post’s coverage of the SIC Report across 2014, including declassification day. 
Longitudinal, qualitative analysis enables detection of small, seemingly insignificant SPC instances (as 
political-intelligence elites drip-feed items to the press). The Post was chosen for this task because, being 
Washington policy-makers’ newspaper of record, it is likely to closely attend to political machinations 
around the SIC Report, thereby facilitating identification of SPC information provision tactics.
Sampling to detect SPC’s influence in The Washington Post
Analysing SPC’s press influence during periods of official silence is challenging: frequently, hard news 
stories have nothing to report given absence of official documentary evidence. However, as declassi-
fication of the SIC Report was eagerly anticipated and extensively discussed, examination not just of 
hard news stories but also opinion stories (commentaries, letters, blogs and editorials) maximized the 
likelihood of finding press coverage. Furthermore, examining both hard news and opinion stories is 
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important in understanding SPC’s potential influence, as the public may be influenced by any aspect 
of press coverage.
The Washington Post was chosen to analyse the impact of political-intelligence SPC because 
The Post provides a tough test. More generally, The Post has periodically made public demands for 
 political-intelligence elite accountability since Watergate36; specific to this case study, The Post was the 
first US press outlet to provide evidence in 2005 of a torture-intelligence policy (rather than accepting 
Bush administration spin that any evidence of torture resulted from isolated abuse by ‘bad apples’ in 
the military).37 Furthermore, The Post has a commitment to journalistic objectivity which, at least in 
theory, should make SPC more difficult to achieve.
To ascertain SPC’s impact across its two identified phases, The Post was examined in the year prior 
to declassification day (the period of occasionally punctured silence) and declassification day itself 
(the period of information glut). keyword searches (‘Committee Study of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program’ and ‘Senate Intelligence Committee Torture Report’) 
in The Post’s online database (1 January–31 December 2014) returned 107 relevant items (44 hard 
news stories; 63 opinion stories in the form of 26 blogs, 26 commentaries/opinions, seven letters 
and four editorials), with the biggest spike being declassification day on 9 December (15 hard news 
stories; 16 opinion stories comprising 10 blogs, two letters, three commentaries/opinions and one 
editorial) (see Figure 1).
All political-intelligence elite and press documents described above were qualitatively and sys-
tematically analysed to ascertain if, and on what aspects, the US political-intelligence elite and The 
Post make accountability demands. All accountability demands were noted, disaggregated according 
to whether they are made by political-intelligence elite members (for instance, in their declassified 
documents or via the press through quotes, leaks, commentaries and letters) or whether they are 
made by other actors, including directly by journalists (for instance, in opinion stories). This enables a 
systematic comparison of accountability demands made by the US political-intelligence elite and The 
Post in the SPC phase of occasionally punctured silence (pre-declassification day) and in the SPC phase 
of information glut (declassification day). However, analysis of The Post alone does not give a proper 
flavor of SPC’s impact during information glut.
Sampling to explore SPC’s wider influence in the information glut phase
During SPC’s information glut phase there was a surfeit of official information and a corresponding 
spike in press coverage (as indicated in Figure 1, with the December spike). As public attention is a 
finite resource, SPC’s impact is best analysed by examining what, out of the plethora of news stories 
available, people actually engaged with. Thus, in the information glut phase, as well as analysing The 
Post, my focus widens to explore SPC’s reach in news popular on social network, Twitter. As this is an 
open, unruly, globalized forum (as described by the chaos theory), this provides another tough test 
of SPC’s influence: for SPC to be influential here, it must be widely disseminated and engaged with.
Figure 1. number of stories in The Washington Post (Jan–dec 2014) on Senate Intelligence committee torture report.
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Twitter (rather than other big social networks) was chosen because, at least for US users, tweets 
from news outlets make up a significant portion of a user’s feed; and users are more interested in news 
about government and politics than posts from family and friends (as with Facebook).38 Furthermore, 
Twitter’s users demonstrably engaged with the SIC Report, evidenced by ‘#TortureReport’ trending on 
declassification day. This sample, then, maximizes the likelihood of finding news stories on the SIC Report 
that actually engaged people. The sample, of course, is not meant to be nationally representative of 
the general population’s engagement with press coverage of the SIC Report, as Twitter audiences are 
typically younger and better educated.39 Nonetheless, this news sample organically derived from social 
media popularity is methodologically useful in indicating what a specific audience in an unruly media 
environment found compelling enough to engage with (through retweeting, liking and commenting).
From declassification day, top tweets (namely, tweets that Twitter users most engaged with) circu-
lating via ‘#TortureReport’, as well whatever website they hyperlinked to, were gathered. This material 
was qualitatively analysed, generating 200 accountability demands, disaggregated by who made the 
demand, in what form (hard news versus opinion stories or tweets) and in what news genre. Over half 
(115 accountability demands) were made by news organizations, comprising diverse American, British 
and international news outlets across mainstream and alternative news genres (see Table 1). Most of 
these accountability demands came from news outlets’ tweets and links via Twitter to their news stories; 
or by non-news entities (such as NGOs, think tanks and independent citizens) linking, via their tweets, 
to news stories making accountability demands.
Generating the benchmark of accountability demands
This research uses thematic analysis, a qualitative method involving iterative processes of prior theori-
zation and inductive study to generate theoretically-informed, data-supported themes.40 Informed by 
journalism and intelligence scholarship, and refined by systematically comparing and testing emerging 
themes suggested by this literature against the above data-set, I delineate a typology of accountabil-
ity demands and component public dialogue strategies (see Table 2). (The sample of accountability 
Table 1.  news outlets making accountability demands in top tweets on 
declassification day.
Type of News Outlet Specific News Outlet










uS collaborative journalism MuckRock
Mashable
uS political proceedings channel C-Span
uS tV conversation/debate show Moyers & Company




International news agency Reuters
International news channel al-Jazeera America
news aggregator Bipartisan Report
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demands described above enabled theoretical saturation of the typology, as no new variations on the 
public dialogue strategies were forthcoming.)
The first accountability demand concerns the accuracy and value of intelligence (AD1). Intelligence 
reports, being based on uncertain, fragmentary knowledge, are vulnerable to political manipulation and 
politicization.41 Research identifying political manipulation of intelligence risk for public consumption 
includes kaufmann’s examination of Bush administration inflation of the WMD threat to justify invading 
Iraq42; and Bakir’s examination of Bush administration public manipulation of intelligence on EITs’ legal-
ity and utility.43 Given such manipulation, critical press responses are vital. Accordingly, Bean outlines 
three Public Dialogue Strategies (PDS) for journalists: assessing the strength of analysis underlying an 
administration’s public characterization of intelligence (PDS1); determining the intelligence community’s 
level of consensus on a given issue (PDS2); and uncovering the level of uncertainty regarding intelligence 
assessments (PDS3) (see Table 2, Row One).44 However, as well as demanding accountability concerning 
intelligence accuracy and value, it is important to demand accountability for political responses to 
inaccurate, or otherwise problematic, intelligence. As Johnson observes, intelligence failures may be 
caused by policy-makers ignoring intelligence due to arrogance, time pressures and political biases.45 
In such cases, it is imperative that the press publicly scrutinizes political responses to intelligence fail-
ures or controversies.
I therefore propose a second accountability demand concerning political responses to intelligence 
controversies (AD2) (see Table 2, Row Two). Studies find journalists succumbing to politicians’ desire 
for closure on controversial security issues. Schlosberg’s empirical analysis of British news coverage of 
alleged corruption by British AeroSpace Systems (BAe) finds that as this case culminated, BAe’s inter-
pretation dominated (that it was reformed), negating need for further sanction.46 Similarly, Bakir finds 
that once the Bush administration’s secret torture-intelligence policy was exposed, public inquiries and 
investigations were generated with tightly defined remits focusing on military involvement, conclud-
ing that mistakes had been rectified, and diverting attention from intelligence agencies.47 Given such 
artificial issue resolution, and misdirection to tangential areas where reform has already happened, I 
propose that a fourth public dialogue strategy should assess the level of further work needed to achieve 
full accountability (PDS4).
Research on the detention and interrogation program shows that politicians denied the existence 
of this secret policy by presenting perpetrators of torture caught on camera (Military Police at Abu 
Ghraib) as abusing policy rather than enacting the secret torture-intelligence policy, thereby shielding 
politicians from responsibility.48 As global monitoring of torture depends not just on exposing torture, 
but holding state agents responsible for torture conducted on their watch,49 I propose a fifth public 
dialogue strategy to assess the extent to which political responsibility is taken (PDS5). Yet assessing 
political responses to intelligence controversies ignores wider ethical, moral and legal frameworks 
(for instance, of international human rights) within which political-intelligence elites should, but may 
not, operate. Such frameworks transcend narrow frameworks of acceptability such as being ‘in the 
national interest’.
Table 2. Benchmark of accountability demands (ad) and Public dialogue Strategies (PdS) to hold political-intelligence elites to 
account.
Accountability Demands Public Dialogue Strategies 
ad1: accuracy & value of intelligence PdS1. Strength of analysis underlying an administration’s 
public characterization of intelligence
PdS2. level of consensus across the intelligence community
PdS3. level of uncertainty regarding intelligence assessments 
ad2: Political response to intelligence controversies PdS4. level of further work needed to achieve full account-
ability
PdS5. extent to which political responsibility is taken
ad3: ethics, morality & legality of how intelligence is gained/
used
PdS6. Whether human/civil rights are compromised
PdS7. Whether principles of fairness/justice/ morality are 
compromised
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As such, I offer a third accountability demand concerning the ethics, morality and legality of how 
intelligence is gained or for what it will be used (AD3) (see Table 2, Row Three). In national security and 
intelligence issues, nation-states may contravene established international ethical or legal norms 
to protect their national interest. For instance, the Bush administration, apparently desperate to 
prevent another 9/11 by eliciting actionable intelligence from detained Al Qaeda suspects, secretly 
generated complex legal arguments to buttress their stance that EITs did not constitute torture: US 
national security concerns thereby negated the universal human right to freedom from torture.50 
Consequently, I propose a sixth public dialogue strategy to assess whether human and civil rights 
are compromised through acquisition or use of intelligence (PDS6). International human rights and 
humanitarian law are not the only source of ethical guidelines, however. People invoke many codes 
of morality, informed, for instance, by religion or a sense of fairness. Thus, emerging in a data-first 
manner from this case study, is the seventh public dialogue strategy: assessing the extent to which 
principles of fairness, justice and morality are compromised through acquisition or use of intelligence 
(PDS7).
Having developed the typology, the data-set is systematically analysed to see if it contains an 
accountability demand (via Public Dialogue Strategies 1–7), and if so, whether it is a weak demand 
(pointing out problems, but falling short of calling for subsequent action) or a strong demand (calling for 
action, reform or redress). If any of these texts exhibited more than one type of public dialogue strategy, 
or both a weak and strong version of the same public dialogue strategy, each different public dialogue 
strategy or version was recorded as separate instances of the accountability demand. But repeated 
examples within a text of the same accountability demand or public dialogue strategy version (weak 
or strong) were counted as one instance of the accountability demand. Hence, this analysis highlights 
the range of accountability demands made across these various texts.
Table 3 presents only the strong accountability demands found in the data-set, disaggregating these 
by actor and time (there were no strong demands concerning AD1). Columns One and Two respectively 
show the political-intelligence elite’s strong accountability demands made in the year before declas-
sification day, and on declassification day. Columns Three and Four respectively show The Washington 
Post’s strong accountability demands made in the year before declassification day, and on declassifi-
cation day. Column Five shows strong accountability demands made by news popular on Twitter on 
declassification day. Table 3 shows how some strong accountability demands and component public 
dialogue strategies (for instance, PDS4’s demand for transparency) are made by all actors throughout 
2014, whereas others (for instance, PDS5’s demands to hold the Bush administration to account) are 
made only by the press. Drilling down further shows how some public dialogue strategies are made 
only at certain times and by certain elements of the political-intelligence elite or press. It is to this level 
of granularity that the analysis turns.
SPC in the torture-intelligence issue across 2014
Before declassification day: an occasionally punctured official silence
That political-intelligence elite revelations on the SIC Report were elevated to SPC is evident in the 
type and quantity of information publicized. While the SIC Report was completed in 2012, it took two 
years for declassification of its Executive Summary, the delay enabling the political-intelligence elite, 
including the CIA, to orchestrate a public response. During these years, the US political-intelligence 
elite largely maintained a silence, withholding official documents and refusing to speak officially about 
them. Nonetheless, analysing the year prior to declassification shows that this silence was occasionally 
punctured by two modes of discourse:
(a)  Political-intelligence elite-driven claims involving allegations and opinions, but lacking evidence. 
Examples include public allegations by Dianne Feinstein (Senate Intelligence Committee chair) 
of CIA spying on the computer database of the Senate Intelligence Committee panel investigat-
ing the detention and interrogation program51; and opinion stories from Bush administration 
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political-intelligence elite members such as Jose Rodriguez Jr. (former head of the CIA’s National 
Clandestine Service) on the program’s high value.52
(b)  Political-intelligence elite-driven authorized leaks of selected facts, but lacking evidence. The main 
example is the drip-feed across 2014 of the SIC Report’s key findings. Note that officially sanc-
tioned leaks are a well-recognized mechanism of securing political advantage for the side 
leaking.53
Through these two modes of discourse, one comprising claims, the other comprising selected facts, but 
both lacking supporting evidence, the political-intelligence elite aired several accountability demands 
before declassification day. As demonstrated later, these demands set up the CIA to credibly take all 
blame for the detention and interrogation program on declassification day, while propagating the idea 










News on Twitter 
(D-Day)
ad2: Political response to intelligence controversies





Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency








•  Better civilian 
oversight
•  Internal cIa 
reform






Enact policies to 
make torture less 
likely:
Enact policies to 
make torture less 
likely: 
Enact policies to 
make torture less 
likely:
•  legislate 
obama’s cIa 
executive order
•  Make water-
boarding illegal




•  Strengthen doJ 
review
•  legislate 
obama’s cIa 
executive order
•  Ban cIa from 
detaining
•  give Icrc de-
tainee access
•  Protect  
whistle-blowers
•  allow torture 
victims to sue
•  Make following 
illegal orders 
invalid defence




Hold Bush admin 
to account
Hold Bush admin to 
account
Hold Bush admin 
to account














ad3: ethics, morality & legality of how intelligence is gained/used
 P dS6. Human/
civil rights 
compromised 
Never torture again Never torture again Never torture again Never torture again
 P dS7. Fairness/ 
justice/ morality 
compromised
Never use EITs 
again
Never use EITs 
again
Never use EITs 
again 
Never use EITs 
again 
10  V. BAkIR
that the SIC Report’s partial declassification was the most important act in securing accountability, with 
no further action required.
Declassification day: a coordinated information glut of misdirection
After years of silence, four official documents were released on declassification day, two blaming and 
two defending the CIA. The most substantial document at 528 pages is the Executive Summary, summa-
rising the SIC Report’s 6700 pages. It repeatedly evidences how EITs failed to produce good intelligence, 
noting the CIA’s dishonesty to the White House and Congress about EITs’ efficacy. Mostly supporting 
the Executive Summary is a 27-page report expressing additional views from five senators.54 The CIA 
response comprises 136 pages rebutting the Executive Summary’s conclusions.55 The 167-page Senate 
Intelligence Committee Minority Views56 report largely echoes the CIA response.
These political-intelligence elite documents and manner of release indicate SPC on three fronts. 
Firstly, it indicates PR coordination between different political-intelligence elite elements. In a single 
day, after years of official silence (barring occasional claims and authorized leaks), the press was pro-
vided with an information glut. While all four official documents were completed at different stages 
across 2012–14, they were declassified on the same day, totalling 858 pages, with the SIC Report’s 
Executive Summary provided to the media only 24 h in advance (embargoed) to give it a head start.57 
This strains the press’ scarce resources of time and personnel (to analyse), making it more likely to 
rely on interpretive frameworks provided by others (as in Jackson and Moloney’s editorial subsidies).58 
Secondly, the SPC compensates for this strain by providing a specific interpretive framework, through 
two substantial documents that blame, and two documents that defend, the CIA. This offers elite 
dissensus on a specific point (whether the CIA is to blame) enabling the press to achieve professional 
ideals of balance and critique. Indeed, The Post embraces this format of balance in its most data-rich 
hard news story on declassification day: this story links to the four declassified official documents 
thereby offering a balanced set of links (two blaming, and two exonerating, the CIA).59 Thirdly, the 
critique offered is limited, making few strong accountability demands, and it is here that misdirection 
occurs. This following section demonstrates this by examining each accountability demand and com-
ponent public dialogue strategy, highlighting those offered by the political-intelligence elite before 
and on declassification day, as well as the press’ response in two tough press environments (The Post 
and news popular on Twitter).
Accountability demands in the torture-intelligence issue across 2014
AD1: accuracy and value of intelligence
While no strong accountability demands concerning intelligence accuracy and value (AD1) are made, 
there are plenty of weak accountability demands.
PDS1: strength of analysis underlying an administration’s public characterization of intelligence
Pre-declassification day, parts of the political-intelligence elite made weak accountability demands 
through authorized leaks from the SIC Report, claiming that the CIA exaggerated EITs’ intelligence yields; 
on declassification day, the SIC Report’s Executive Summary repeatedly evidences these claims.60 This 
is only a weak accountability demand, highlighting a problem, but not calling for further action (such 
as demanding a higher minimum standard of evidence before enacting controversial policy decisions). 
Repeatedly across 2014, both before declassification day (15 hard news and four opinion stories) and on 
declassification day (two hard news and six opinion stories), this weak demand surfaces in The Post. For 
instance: ‘The committee’s 6,000-page report accuses the CIA of systematically misleading government 
officials on the severity of the methods and their effectiveness’.61 Similarly, on declassification day, the 
most frequent public dialogue strategy in news popular on Twitter is a weak version of PDS1 pointing 
out the ineffectiveness of CIA torture: it is found in British and US mainstream news, US collaborative 
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and investigative journalism, US political proceedings channel, US television conversation and debate 
show, an international news channel, and citizen journalists. For instance, British mainstream news 
(Julian Borger, The Guardian’s diplomatic editor) tweets: ‘Not a single case holds up’ Sen Dianne Feinstein 
on CIA claims torture produced actionable, lifesaving intelligence. #CIA #TortureReport.
PDS2: level of consensus across intelligence community
Throughout 2014, the political-intelligence elite was divided on the value of intelligence yielded by the 
program, their dissensus reflected in the press. For instance, on declassification day, out of The Post’s 31 
news items, six hard news stories and seven opinion stories mainly or totally voice the SIC’s Executive 
Summary (that EITs failed to generate valuable intelligence), with two hard news and two opinion stories 
mainly or totally voicing the CIA’s rebuttal (that the SIC Report’s conclusions on intelligence value are 
flawed given inadequate methodology and unfamiliarity with how the CIA uses intelligence). News 
popular on Twitter replicated this pattern on declassification day. As no part of the political-intelligence 
elite or press suggested consequential action, reform or redress arising from this lack of consensus 
(for instance, that controversial policy decisions should not be enacted without a more consensual 
intelligence community response), this is only a weak version of PDS2.
PDS3: level of uncertainty regarding intelligence assessments
The political-intelligence elite only minimally addressed the inherent uncertainty of intelligence assess-
ments. Only on declassification day does a CIA fact sheet draw attention to the unknowability of whether 
intelligence gained through EITs could have been obtained otherwise: a weak accountability demand 
pointing out a problem without suggesting a remedy. Accordingly, this weak demand appears in The 
Post on declassification day (one hard news and two opinion stories) referencing the CIA fact sheet. 
For instance:
The fact sheet stated that the agency ‘takes no position’ on whether the intelligence information gained through 
its enhanced interrogation techniques ‘could have been obtained through other means or from other individuals. 
The answer to this question is, and will remain, unknowable’.62
News popular on Twitter on declassification day does not make this accountability demand, either in 
weak or strong forms.
AD2: political response to intelligence controversies
PDS4: level of further work needed to achieve full accountability
Before declassification day, the US political-intelligence elite frequently demanded greater transpar-
ency, namely that the SIC Report be declassified with minimal CIA redactions (see Table 3, Column 
One). On declassification day, Additional Senate Intelligence Committee Views continues to strongly 
demand transparency (see Table 3, Column Two).63 Similarly, both before and on declassification day 
most of The Post’s strong demands were for such transparency (see Table 3, Columns Three and Four). 
For instance, its editorial states:
We don’t discount warnings that releasing the report might rouse anti-American sentiment in the near term. But in 
the long term, the United States will benefit by demonstrating a commitment to transparency and self-criticism.64
Strong demands for transparency were evident mostly in its opinion stories, but also in hard news 
stories: pre-declassification day there were strong demands across 15 opinion stories and one hard 
news story; on declassification day there were strong demands in two opinion stories and one hard 
news story. Where The Post’s hard news stories made strong pro-transparency accountability demands, 
they quote other actors such as Hina Shamsi, ACLU’s National Security Project director,65 and Sen. 
Rockefeller.66 In news popular on Twitter on declassification day, there are only two instances of strong 
demands for transparency. One is a tweet from British mainstream news (The Telegraph): ‘#TortureReport: 
We can only hope that its release will spur further steps towards the truth’. The other strong demand 
comes via a Washington Post journalist’s tweet that links to a 2007 Post hard news story reporting that 
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Sen. Rockefeller (then Senate Intelligence Committee chair) planned to investigate the fate of missing 
detainees when examining the rendition program.67
Beyond demanding transparency, before declassification day the political-intelligence elite is silent 
on other strong accountability demands concerning political responses to intelligence controversies 
(see Table 3, Column One). However, The Post is more assertive in this period, for instance, strongly 
demanding (via an opinion column and letters) that the medical community be held accountable for its 
role in CIA torture (see Table 3, Column Three):
I want to know whether trained medical personnel – physicians, psychologists – attended the torture sessions. I’m 
sure the relevant professional associations and licensing boards would like to know as well.68
The other strong demand made by The Post before declassification day is for greater CIA accountability 
(see Table 3, Column Three). This appeared in two hard news and seven opinion stories, with demands 
for better civilian oversight, to further investigate and fire CIA staff for spying on the Senate intelligence 
committee panel, for criminal prosecution of American interrogators, and for the CIA to apologize 
and issue reparations. For example: ‘There is only one appropriate response … Acknowledge that the 
agency did wrong, issue a formal apology, and, where appropriate, pay reparations’.69 By declassifica-
tion, day, sections of the political-intelligence elite also strongly demand greater CIA accountability (for 
better civilian oversight of intelligence agencies and for internal CIA reform) (see Table 3, Column Two), 
this demand emanating both from Additional Senate Intelligence Committee Views70 and the CIA.71 
Interestingly, at this point The Post makes minimal calls for action, redress or reform (see Table 3, Column 
Four), only once demanding prosecution of illegal acts described in the SIC Report (citing Roth, Executive 
Director of Human Rights Watch [HRW]). Instead, overwhelmingly it makes weak demands concerning 
CIA accountability, detailing how the CIA avoided oversight and ignored internal criticisms. As with The 
Post, news outlets popular on Twitter on declassification day frequently echo the weak demand that 
the CIA impeded oversight, appearing extensively across US and Uk mainstream news, US television 
conversation and debate show, and US investigative and collaborative journalism.
Another strong accountability demand from the political-intelligence elite on declassification day 
is to enact policies to make torture less likely in the future (see Table 3, Column Two). Feinstein’s Foreword 
to the SIC Report demands to legislate Obama’s 2009 Executive Order restricting the CIA from holding 
detainees and limiting interrogation techniques to those used in the Army Field Manual.72 Additional 
Senate Intelligence Committee Views articulates many more policy recommendations to make tor-
ture less likely, comprising making waterboarding illegal; improving CIA controls in managing covert 
actions; and strengthening review processes at the Department of Justice’s (DoJ) Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) for legal opinions on sensitive intelligence activities, such as its since withdrawn Bush-era ‘tor-
ture memos’ justifying EITs.73 While on declassification day the political-intelligence elite makes many 
strong demands on enacting policies to make torture less likely, The Post is more selective (see Table 3, 
Column Four), only citing Feinstein’s demand but ignoring other policies called for in Additional Senate 
Intelligence Committee Views:
Indeed, as committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) noted, President Obama’s self-imposed executive order 
to restrict the CIA from holding detainees and to limit interrogation techniques to those in the Army Field Manual 
‘could be overturned by a future president with the stroke of a pen’. As Feinstein argued, ‘They should be enshrined 
in legislation’.74
By contrast, news popular on Twitter is more expansive. For instance, a Reuters blog75 written by Roth 
(HRW) suggests giving the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regular detainee access; 
improving whistle-blower protection; allowing torture victims to sue for compensation in American 
courts; and stating that following clearly illegal orders is an invalid defence (see Table 3, Column Five).
PDS5: extent to which political responsibility is taken
The political-intelligence elite rarely suggested that further political responsibility be taken for the 
detention and interrogation program, making no strong accountability demands on this point (see 
Table 3, Columns One and Two). Its weak demands on political responsibility were also rare, limited to 
the CIA occasionally pointing out in opinion pieces published in the year preceding declassification that 
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the Bush administration and Bush-era Democrats had approved the CIA program. While such statements 
assign political responsibility, they do not suggest further action, and so remain weak accountability 
demands. By contrast, The Post is more assertive pre-declassification day (see Table 3, Column Three), 
its opinion stories strongly demanding greater accountability from the Bush administration, as in this 
editorial:
What the CIA did after Sept. 11, 2001, was part of a covert action program authorized by the president; when the 
full report comes out, we hope for a debate that goes beyond just the CIA. It should be about decisions made by 
President George W. Bush.76
On declassification day, The Post continues its strong demands for greater Bush administration account-
ability (see Table 3, Column Four), quoting others in its hard news stories, such as United Nations (UN) 
Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Ben Emmerson77; and in a video-based 
opinion piece by Roth (HRW).78 News popular on Twitter on declassification day offers a fuller set of 
strong demands than The Post concerning US political responsibility (see Table 3, Column Five). Many 
news tweets and linked news stories (both hard news and opinion stories) call for indictments and legal 
investigations of Bush administration officials and war criminals. These comprise a hard news story by 
collaborative journalism outlet, Mashable, citing UN Special Rapporteur Emmerson79; multiple tweets 
from The Guardian’s diplomatic editor, Borger, again citing Emmerson; a Reuters blog post penned by 
Roth (HRW)80; an old blog post by Glenn Greenwald on the Guardian’s Comment is Free81; a hard news 
story by investigative journalism outlet, VICE NEWS, citing Steven Hawkins, Amnesty International US 
executive director82; and tweets from news aggregator Bipartisan Report. For instance, accompanied 
by a group photograph of the Bush administration in the White House, captioned ‘Torture. Yes we did’, 
Bipartisan Report tweets, ‘We deserve an indictment from Bush/Cheney criminals #TortureReport’.83 
Citizen journalist Abby Martin’s tweet strongly demands that Bush-era Democrats who sanctioned 
torture be held accountable: ‘Remember when Pelosi said “impeachment is off the table” for Bush? 
Democrats didn’t want to be implicated and are just as guilty #TortureReport’; Finally, a Washington 
DC lawyer in Frontline’s opinion story demands that politicians who want to ban torture should be held 
accountable for subsequent terrorist acts.84
Compared to political-intelligence elites, the press is also more assertive in strongly demanding 
that countries complicit in the detention and interrogation program should accept political responsibility. 
Pre-declassification day, The Post demands in an opinion piece85 and a hard news story86 that Poland 
accepts responsibility for its complicity (voicing the European Court of Human Rights and Open Society 
Justice Initiative) (see Table 3, Column Three). On declassification day, The Post in a hard news story 
voices NGO Reprieve calling for the Uk to acknowledge its complicity (see Table 3, Column Four): ‘The 
Uk’s behind the curve in terms of examining their behavior’.87 Similarly, in news popular on Twitter on 
declassification day, an opinion story in The Telegraph by Open Society Justice Initiative’s senior legal 
officer for national security and counterterrorism, calls for publicization of British and other foreign 
governments’ complicity (see Table 3, Column Five): ‘Torture report is a vital step for US, but what was 
Britain’s role?’88
AD3: ethics, morality and legality of how intelligence is gained/used
PDS6: whether human/civil rights are compromised
Before declassification day, the political-intelligence elite eschews strong accountability demands con-
cerning compromised human or civil rights (see Table 3, Column One). While some, including Obama 
and Senators, note that torture and secret detention are illegal, no demands for action, reform or redress 
accompany such statements. As such, these statements remain weak accountability demands. It is 
not until declassification day that Additional Senate Intelligence Committee Views strongly demands 
accountability – namely, that torture should never happen again (PDS6) (see Table 3, Column Two).89 
Unlike the political-intelligence elite, both weak and strong accountability demands concerning com-
promised human or civil rights surface in The Post both before and on declassification day, each time 
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apparent in hard news and opinion stories (see Table 3, Columns Three and Four). For instance, a pre- 
declassification day commentary strongly demands: ‘We can also act to ensure torture never happens 
again’.90 Less forceful than The Post, news popular on Twitter frequently air PDS6 in weak versions (stating 
that torture is illegal) but almost never in a strong version (see Table 3, Column Five). The sole example 
of a strong accountability demand is Frontline whose tweet links to its opinion story in 2005 with US 
lawyers and law academics, some of whom articulate the need to uphold the torture ban.91
PDS7: whether principles of fairness/justice/morality are compromised
Rather than dwelling on whether EITs constitute torture, or on torture’s illegality and human or civil rights 
contravened, the political-intelligence elite often describe EITs simply as ‘wrong’ and ‘un- American’ – 
Feinstein’s favoured adjectives throughout 2014. This weakly invokes PDS7 (pointing out that fairness, 
justice or morality have been compromised). The political-intelligence elite also strongly demand 
throughout 2014, that EITs should never be used again, being careful to use this euphemism rather 
than ‘torture’ (see Table 3, Column One), this strong demand continuing on declassification day (see 
Table 3, Column Two). This strong demand surfaces in The Post, albeit infrequently (see Table 3, Columns 
Three and Four). For instance, an opinion story cites Feinstein: ‘declassifying the report would “ensure 
that an un-American, brutal program of detention and interrogation will never again be considered 
or permitted”‘.92 More commonly, however, it was weak demands that appear in The Post, across both 
hard news and opinion stories, again usually citing Feinstein. News popular on Twitter makes only weak 
accountability demands (see Table 3, Column Five).
Discussion
Utility of the benchmark
In theorizing what constitutes effective press oversight of political-intelligence elites, I have developed 
three Accountability Demands operating through seven Public Dialogue Strategies, presented in weak 
forms (documenting problems, but refraining from calls for action) and strong forms (demanding action, 
reform or redress) (see Table 2). Directing attention not just to the intelligence (as Bean advocates),93 but 
also to political responses and wider ethical, moral and legal questions provides a benchmark both for 
scholars assessing the press’ ability to hold political-intelligence elites accountable; and for journalists 
seeking to make fuller accountability demands of political-intelligence elites.
Using the benchmark to evaluate press oversight of political-intelligence elites
Political-intelligence elite SPC
Examining Obama administration SPC confirms and refines the strategy of secrecy identified in intelli-
gence scholarship. Prior to declassification day, the US political-intelligence elite maintained an official 
silence, occasionally punctured by (a) political-intelligence elite-driven claims involving allegations and 
opinions, and (b) political-intelligence elite-driven authorized leaks of selected facts. As both modes 
of discourse fail to present supporting evidence, it is difficult to challenge political-intelligence elites’ 
interpretations. Together, these modes of discourse generated weak accountability demands that 
malign the CIA’s character (for exaggerating the program’s intelligence yields [PDS1] and for evading 
official oversight [PDS4]), while limiting strong accountability demands to calls for transparency (PDS4) 
and for EITs to never happen again, being wrong and un-American (PDS7) (see Table 3, Column One). 
This sets the stage for partial declassification of the SIC Report to constitute the most important act in 
securing accountability while credibly setting-up the CIA to shoulder all blame for the detention and 
interrogation program.
While research documents a range of manipulative techniques involving intelligence agencies, this 
study adds to that list the technique of a coordinated information glut of misdirection. On declassification 
day, the Washington political-intelligence elite provides a coordinated information glut of declassified 
official documents. By declassifying two official documents that blame, and two that defend, the CIA, 
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this plays to the professional practice of objectivity in news outlets such as The Post, while encouraging 
journalists to focus on a narrowly circumscribed point of elite dissensus – namely, whether the CIA was 
to blame. Here, strong accountability demands in the political-intelligence elite’s two most prominent 
official documents – SIC Report94 and the CIA response95 – focus on strengthening intelligence oversight 
via internal CIA reform, misdirecting attention from wider political responsibility or accountability, for 
instance, from policy-makers, the executive or lawyers responsible for the detention and interrogation 
program (see Table 3, Column Two).
Press oversight
This SPC has variable success in influencing the press’ accountability demands. The Washington Post is 
better able to hold the political-intelligence elite to account when SPC comprises an occasionally punc-
tured official silence (the period prior to declassification day) than when SPC comprises a coordinated 
information glut of misdirection (declassification day). This is evident in two ways.
Firstly, prior to declassification day, The Post presents a wider range of strong accountability demands 
than offered by the US political-intelligence elite (see Table 3, Columns One and Three). These concerned 
PDS4, demanding (via opinion stories) that the medical community be held accountable for its role in 
CIA torture; and demanding (via hard news and opinion stories) greater CIA accountability in terms of 
oversight, apologies, reparations and prosecutions. They also concerned PDS5, demanding (via opinion 
stories) greater accountability from the Bush administration; and demanding (via hard news and opinion 
stories) that other countries accept political responsibility for their complicity.
Secondly, on declassification day, as SPC switches to a coordinated information glut misdirecting 
journalism towards the tightly circumscribed dissensus focussing on the CIA, The Post largely follows 
suit, as follows:
(a) The Post extensively presents weak accountability demands that reflect those of the political- 
intelligence elite in focusing on the CIA (observations that the CIA exaggerated intelligence (PDS1), that 
the CIA disagreed with this claim (PDS2), and that the CIA avoided and impeded Congressional oversight 
(PDS4)). This CIA focus is reinforced by occasional strong demands for greater CIA  accountability – 
namely, for prosecution (PDS4).
(b) The Post presents a narrower range of strong accountability demands than it did in the preceding 
year (see Table 3, Columns Three and Four). Those that disappear are demands for greater accountabil-
ity from the medical community (PDS4); and certain avenues of holding the CIA accountable (civilian 
oversight, apologies, reparations) (PDS4).
(c) The Post fails to present those strong accountability demands that are not endorsed by the entire 
political-intelligence elite. The Post does not present calls for policies to make torture less likely (PDS4), 
such as making waterboarding illegal or strengthening the DoJ’s review process, where: (i) these calls are 
made only by part of the political-intelligence elite - namely, Additional Senate Intelligence Committee 
Views; and (ii) which extend the focus from the CIA to other elements of the political administration, 
such as those who ordered waterboarding and the DoJ (See Table 3, Columns Two and Four).
Significantly, during times of SPC characterized by a coordinated information glut of misdirection, this 
pattern found in The Post (of extensively presenting weak accountability demands that reflect those of 
the political-intelligence elite, focussing attention on the CIA) is replicated by most of the news organ-
izations popular on Twitter making accountability demands. This confounds the chaos paradigm’s96 
expectations concerning unruly media environments. Given that industry reports show that Twitter (and 
Facebook) users across all demographics are increasingly using the social networks as news sources,97 
the fact that a coordinated information glut of misdirection is able to shape accountability demands in 
Twitter’s top tweets – an open, globalized forum – is a significant finding.
Yet, this is not the full story. While news popular on Twitter focused on scapegoating the CIA, thereby 
succumbing to SPC, it simultaneously expressed a wider range of strong accountability demands. For 
instance, compared to The Post on declassification day, news popular on Twitter called for a wider range 
of specific policies to make torture’s recurrence less likely; for prosecution of Democrats who agreed to the 
detention and interrogation program; and for greater political accountability from politicians who want 
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to ban EITs (see Table 3, Columns Four and Five). Notably, where these strong accountability demands 
appear in news popular on Twitter, they do so only in: (a) old hard news stories in US mainstream 
news outlets (The Washington Post); (b) in contemporary hard news, opinion stories and tweets in US 
non-mainstream news outlets, comprising citizen journalism (Abby Martin’s tweet), collaborative jour-
nalism (Mashable’s hard news), investigative journalism (Frontline’s opinion story; VICE News’ hard news), 
and a news aggregator (Bipartisan Report’s tweets); and (c) opinion stories in international mainstream 
news outlets, comprising an international news agency (Reuters’ blog) and British press (Guardian’s 
tweets and blog, The Telegraph’s tweet and opinion stories). Significantly, these strong accountability 
demands are totally absent from contemporary US mainstream news popular on Twitter. This indi-
cates the importance of press diversity and of international press engagement if strong accountability 
demands concerning the US political-intelligence elite hegemon are to be prominently circulated on 
social media.
To conclude, where political-intelligence elite dissensus is managed by SPC comprising an occa-
sionally punctured official silence, the press (exemplified by The Post) goes beyond the Washington 
 political-intelligence elite’s limited accountability demands, and so does a more robust job of demand-
ing real world change: a watchdog role. Where political-intelligence elite dissensus is managed by SPC 
comprising a coordinated information glut of misdirection designed to bring closure to the issue, so the 
press does a less robust job of calling for real world change (indicated by the contraction in strong 
accountability demands expressed in The Post, and by the fact that all news forms popular on Twitter 
predominantly focused on the CIA as the scapegoat). This shows the extensive reach of misdirection, as 
a wide range of news outlets (from The Post to news popular on Twitter) accept Obama administration 
political-intelligence elite editorial subsidies98 thereby indexing99 the Washington political-intelligence 
elite consensus about what should be openly problematized. Indeed, during a coordinated information 
glut of misdirection, the press’ watchdog role (in making strong accountability demands) is maintained 
on Twitter only by old US mainstream press and current US alternative and international mainstream 
press stories, but not by current mainstream US press stories.
Using the benchmark to facilitate better press oversight of political-intelligence elites
Given that this case study presents a best-case scenario for press oversight of political-intelligence elites 
during journalism-as-usual, but that press oversight is found lacking when SPC comprises a coordinated 
information glut of misdirection, what concrete steps could the press have taken to generate better 
accountability?
In the torture-intelligence issue, the press could have used the benchmark as follows. Concerning 
Accountability Demand 1, editors could ask themselves if it is it enough to convey the lack of valuable 
intelligence that EITs delivered (weak accountability demands, merely pointing out problems). It was 
undoubtedly important to document problems with the intelligence, given long-standing, unsubstan-
tiated counter-claims made by supporters of the detention and interrogation program; and given that 
a small majority of Americans thought that the interrogation methods were justified.100 However, the 
press’ failure to also make strong accountability demands means that nobody demanded that pro-
cesses be implemented to prevent exaggeration of intelligence yields recurring in other policies; that 
in future, lack of intelligence community consensus should be reflected in resulting policy decisions; or 
that political-intelligence elites should make clear, when suggesting untested intelligence-gathering 
techniques (like EITs), that they have no way of assessing their effectiveness. Concerning Accountability 
Demand 2, rather than focusing on the detention and interrogation program as being entirely the CIA’s 
fault, as portrayed by Obama’s political-intelligence elite, more of the press could have demanded that 
responsibility be taken by the Bush administration that secretly ordered the program; or by its lawyers 
that secretly legalized it to avoid CIA operatives from retrospectively being charged with torture. On 
Accountability Demand 3, editors could reflect upon whether it is enough to call for EITs to be shelved 
on the basis that they were un-American and wrong. More journalists could have reminded the public 
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that EITs constituted torture: a wilful contravention of international human rights, and a charge that 
demands that state agents are held accountable.
While I have focused on a single case study, the benchmark of accountability demands should be 
useful in any assessment of the press’ ability to hold political-intelligence elites accountable during 
journalism-as-usual. For instance, in July 2016, the Chilcot Inquiry severely criticized how the British 
government took Britain to war in Iraq in 2003, presenting evidence of deceptive practices in the Blair 
administration’s public manipulation of intelligence about the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD capabilities 
and intent,101 but avoiding ‘characterizing this as deception or questioning Blair’s good faith’.102 In this 
case, the benchmark of accountability demands could be used as follows. Concerning AD1 on the accu-
racy and value of intelligence, the Chilcot report presents a letter written by Tony Blair to Bush on 28 July 
2002 in which Blair states that it would be ‘hugely persuasive’ in building a coalition for invading Iraq to 
present evidence that Saddam Hussein was a threat. Blair suggests that, ‘we recapitulate all the WMD 
evidence; add his attempts to secure nuclear capability; and, as seems possible, add on Al Qaida link’103; 
but does the press demand to know the strength of intelligence analysis underlying all these eviden-
tiary elements? Concerning AD2 on political responses to intelligence controversies, Blair’s immediate 
response to the Chilcot report was to take responsibility for his bad decisions concerning the war while 
denying that he ever lied about what he thought the severity of threat posed by Iraq to be104; but does 
the press accept this, or does it demand that the Blair administration should also take responsibility for 
deception over the threat’s severity? Concerning AD3 on the ethical, moral and legal questions of how 
intelligence is used, the Chilcot report presents evidence that Blair had secretly decided that regime 
change in Iraq was necessary regardless of what the intelligence showed about the severity of Iraq’s 
WMD threat105; but does the press demand to know what Blair’s ethical, moral or legal basis was for 
intelligence to be so ignored? In all of this, does the press make any strong demands for subsequent 
action, reform or redress concerning the Blair administration’s public manipulation of intelligence to 
justify going to war, or is Blair’s apology for making bad decisions in good faith accepted as sufficient?
While absence or orchestration (via SPC) of critical political voices may mean that hard news stories 
eschew making certain accountability demands (for instance, due to practices of indexing), having the 
benchmark to hand as a critical mental framework when constructing their stories may make journalists 
less susceptible to SPC and editorial subsidies. Furthermore, there is ample opportunity in opinion stories, 
and in investigative and campaigning journalism, for such accountability demands to be made. The 
accountability demands themselves are framed at a fairly general level, and do not assume in-depth 
knowledge of secret policies. Rather, they provide an inroad for this knowledge to be publicly built up. 
It is only through continuously asking such critical questions that the press can educate themselves 
and the public about political-intelligence elite activity, thereby creating a stronger epistemic position 
from which to better hold political-intelligence elites accountable.
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